In this paper, we establish a relation between an argumentation based system: Defeasible Logic Programming (DELP), and a nonmonotonic system: Reiter's Default Logic. This relation is achieved by introducing a variant of DELP and a transformation that maps default theories to defeasible logic programs. The transformation allows to associate the answers of a DELP Interpreter with the consequences, credulous and skeptical, of the default theory. Thus, this work establishes a link between a well understood nonmonotonic system and a argumentation based system.
Introduction and Motivation
In general, it is interesting and important to compare, analyze and assess the alternative tools that could be used to confront a specific problem. In particular, in the area of Artificial Intelligence there are several research lines dedicated to the development of formalisms and tools regarding Knowledge Representation. These formalisms are so diverse that many times it is difficult to recognize their advantages, disadvantages and differences in order to make a plausible use of them. For this reason, it is interesting to analyze the relation among knowledge representation formalisms to evaluate their differences and similarities. Several works relating diverse approaches of defeasible and non-monotonic reasoning have been developed [8, 7, 5, 6, 2, 3] .
In this paper, we analyze the relation between an argumentation based system like Defeasible Logic Programming (DELP), and a nonmonotonic system like Reiter's Default Logic. In order to establish this relation we introduce (Section 3) a variant of DELP, called DELP ∅ , and a number of properties it verifies. Then, we define a transformation (Seccion 5) that allows to map default theories to defeasible logic programs. The transformation allows to associate the answers of a DELP ∅ interpreter with the consequences, credulous and skeptical, of the original default theory. Finally, we relate the results of this work with the Dung's argumentative framework for Default Logic defined in [9] , and we briefly discuss how the relation established between Default Logic an DELP can be used to relate DELP to other meaningful nonmonotonic formalisms. 
DELP
Defeasible Logic Programming (DELP) is a formalism that combines Logic Programming and Defeasible Argumentation. In DELP, knowledge is represented using facts, strict rules or defeasible rules:
• Facts are ground literals representing atomic information or the negation of atomic information using the strong negation "¬ " (e.g. ¬ rain).
• Strict Rules are denoted L 0 ← L 1 , . . . , L n , where the head L 0 is a ground literal and the body {L i } i>0 is a set of ground literals (e.g. ¬ day ← night).
• Defeasible Rules
. . , L n , where the head L 0 is a ground literal and the body {L i } i>0 is a set of ground literals. (e.g. cold -≺ winter).
Syntactically, the symbol " -≺ " is all that distinguishes a defeasible rule from a strict one. Pragmatically, a defeasible rule is used to represent defeasible knowledge, i.e. tentative information that may be used if nothing could be posed against it. A defeasible rule "Head -≺ Body." is understood as expressing that "reasons to believe in the antecedent Body provide reasons to believe in the consequent Head" [14] .
A Defeasible Logic Program (de.l.p.) P is a set of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules. When required, P is denoted (Π, ∆) distinguishing the subset Πõf facts and strict rules, and the subset ∆of defeasible rules. Observe that strict and defeasible rules are ground.
Strong negation is allowed in the head of program rules, and hence may be used to represent contradictory knowledge. From a program (Π, ∆) contradictory literals could be derived, however, the set Π (which is used to represent nondefeasible information) must possess certain internal coherence. Therefore, Π has to be non-contradictory, i.e. no pair of contradictory literals can be derived from Π. Given a literal L the complement with respect to strong negation will be denoted L (i.e. a = ¬ a and ¬ a = a).
DELP incorporates an argumentation formalism for the treatment of the contradictory knowledge that can be derived from (Π, ∆) This formalism allows the identification of the pieces of knowledge that are in contradiction. A dialectical process is used for deciding which information prevails. In particular, the argumentation-based definition of the inference relation makes it possible to incorporate a treatment of preferences in an elegant way.
In DELP a literal L is warranted from (Π, ∆) if there exists a non-defeated argument A supporting L. In short, an argument for a literal L, denoted A, L , is a minimal set of defeasible rules A⊆∆ such that A∪Π is non-contradictory and there is a derivation for L from A∪Π. In order to establish if A, L is a nondefeated argument, argument rebuttals or counterarguments that could be defeaters for A, L are considered, i.e., counter-arguments that by some criterion are preferred to A, L . An argument A 1 , L 1 counter-argues or attacks A 2 , L 2 at some literal h, if and only if there exists a sub argument
Since counter-arguments are arguments, there may exist defeaters for them, and defeaters for these defeaters, and so on. Thus, a sequence of arguments called argumentation line is constructed, where each argument defeats its predecessor in the line. Some restrictions are imposed over these lines to be considered acceptable argumentation lines.
• Non circularity: circular argumentation lines are not permitted.
• Concordance: the set of supporting arguments must be non contradictory and the same is required for interfering arguments.
• Blocking-Blocking situations: if a blocking defeater A i occurs in the line [A 1 , . . . , A k ], A i+1 cannot be a blocking defeater for A i .
Usually, each argument has more than one defeater and more than one argumentation line exists. Therefore, a tree of arguments called dialectical tree is constructed, where the root is A, h and each path from the root to a leaf is an argumentation line. A dialectical analysis of this tree is used for deciding whether a literal is warranted. This dialectical analysis is carried out labeling the arguments conforming the dialectical tree. The arguments in the leaves of the tree are considered undefeated. Every inner node with at least a child marked as undefeated, is considered and marked as a defeated argument. In the other case, it is undefeated. Following this analysis, a literal h is said warranted if there is a dialectical tree where the root is an argument for h that has been marked as undefeated (for a detailed explanation of this dialectical process see [10] 
DELP ∅ variant
In DELP, several elements can be adjusted thus defining a number of variants of DELP; for instance, the notions of attack and defeat, as well as the conditions required for acceptable argumentation lines. We will consider a DELP variant, that we call DELP ∅ , observing the following condition:
• The relation defining the comparison criterion is the empty set.
In general, given two conflicting arguments A and B, they can be compared using some criterion. In that case, if A is better than B, A is a proper defeater for B. But, if neither of the two is better than the other, A is a blocking defeater for B, and vice versa. Note that, in DELP ∅ , since the comparison criterion is empty, every attack is a blocking defeat and since there are no proper defeaters, this criterion turns attack into defeat.
Remark 3.1 Every argumentation line in DELP
∅ contains two arguments at most.
Suppose there is an acceptable argumentation line
∅ is a blocking defeater, A i+2 is a blocking defeater for A i+1 and, A i+1 is a blocking defeater for A i . But, in this case, Γ would not be an acceptable argumentation line, because there cannot be two consecutive blocking attacks (see the third condition of an acceptable argumentation line).
Remark 3.2 Every dialectical tree in DELP
∅ has, at most, two levels.
Since every path of a dialectical tree is an acceptable argumentation line, and in DELP ∅ , argumentation lines are composed by one or two arguments, every path contains, at most, two arguments. Thus, every dialectical tree has, at most, two levels.
Remark 3.3
Every dialectical tree whose root is marked as undefeated is a tree with just one node.
If the argument of the root has a child, this means that the root has a defeater and the root is then defeated (since, from remark 3.1: there are no defeaters for the defeaters)
Remark 3.4
In DELP ∅ , a literal l is warranted iff any argument for l is not attacked.
If a literal l is warranted there is a dialectical tree, for an argument A supporting l, whose root is marked as undefeated (from the definition of warranted literal in DELP). This dialectical tree has a single node (from remark 3.3 ) and this means that there is no argument attacking it. If there is some argument that attacks the root A, it has to be in the tree and then the root would be marked as defeated.
Remark 3.5 In DELP
∅ an argument A is warranted iff every literal present in A is warranted.
This condition establishes that all literals contained in the defeasible derivation that constitutes a warranted argument are also warranted. Suppose this is not true, then exists a warranted argument A such that a literal L i present in A is not warranted. In this case, every argument for L i is defeated and L i is an attack point in the argument A. Therefore, A is attacked and defeated (from remark 3.4), which cannot happen, since we assumed that A is a warranted argument.
As mentioned, in DELP, two literals p and q disagree if Π ∪ {p, q} is a contradictory set (Π is the set of strict rules). Then, if Π is empty, p and q must be complementary literals.
Remark 3.6
Let A be an argument in DELP ∅ , if a literal p is present in A and there is an argument B for q such that p and q disagree then A is not warranted.
In this case, B attacks A in p, for this reason A is defeated. c , the default rule is called a normal default rule. In general just(δ) denotes the set of justifications present in the rule δ, and given a set of default rules R, just(R) is used to denote all the justifications present in the default rules of R.
The intuitive meaning of a default is: if a can be derived and it is possible to consistently assume each
Another way to characterize extensions in Default Logic is through an operational semantics [1] . In this characterization each extension is defined by a set In(Π), where Π is a closed and successful process. Given a sequence of default rules S = δ 0 , . . . , δ n the set In(S) collects the information obtained by the application of the defaults in S; that is, In(S) = T h(W ∪ {γ | α : β γ occurs in S)}) Then, a process is a special kind of sequence of default rules δ 0 , . . . , δ n where each default δ k is applicable to In( δ 0 , . . . , δ k−1 ). A process Π is closed if there is no applicable default rule δ in D such that δ does not occur in Π, and a process Π is successful if In(Π) ⊢ β for all β that is a justification of some default rule in Π. Given a default theory T = W, D , a literal l is a skeptical consequence of T if l belongs to every extension of T , and l is a credulous consequence of T if l is present in some extension but not in each extension. A default theory that has at least one extension is called coherent.
In this work, we will consider finite propositional default theories with the following restrictions:
1. The theory T = W, D is coherent.
2. The set of facts W is empty.
3. For every default α : β/γ, formulas β and γ are single literals.
Some of these restrictions could be dropped and we will analyse this situation later. We are interested, at this stage, in default theories that verify the condition: W = ∅, since working with these theories enable us to establish an indirect relation between DELP an another nonmonotonic formalisms. In particular, it is well known the works that study the relation between Normal Logic Programming and Default Logic. This connection is achieved through a link between stable models for normal logic programs [11] and skeptical consequences of default theories [4] . Normal logic programs are translated into a default theory composed by an empty set of facts, and a set of default rules obtained as follows. Each rule of the form:
c ← a 1 . . . , a n , not b 1 , . . . , not b m is translated into a default rule of the form:
In this way, a relation between DELP and this type of default theories (with an empty set of facts) establishes a indirect link between DELP and Normal Logic Programming.
Translating Default Theories into DELP ∅ programs
In this section, we present a transformation that allows to map default theories to defeasible logic programs. The transformation is defined for default theories that follow the restrictions given in section 4.
Given a default theory T = ∅, D , we transform T into a de.l.p. P = (∅, ∆) as follows:
1. For each default δ i = α : β/γ ∈ D, the set ∆ in the de.l.p. P includes the following defeasible rules:
where p i is a new literal and rules (ii) and (iii) are called guard rules, and β is the complement of β.
When necessary, we denote the de.l.p. P as T derived. However, this is only allowed if it is possible to consistently assume the justification, β, and this restriction is verified when the second rule does not apply (ii). If the complement of the justification, (i.e. β), is derived, there exists a derivation (and an argument) for ¬ p i and this constitutes an attack to the argument for α. The last rule introduced by the translation (iii) is simply used to enable, by default, the new literal p i .
The translation for a default rule δ = α : β/γ introduces a new literal p i to block the derivation of γ.
That is, in case that the complement of the justification is derived, literal p i turns into an attack point, and the argument for the consequence will be attacked. Therefore, this argument is defeated classifying the literal γ as UNDECIDED.
Note that default rules with an empty prerequisite are written true : β/γ. These rules are translated, in the same way, to the following defeasible rules:
Then, we will show that normal default rules can be translated in a simpler, reduced form.
Example 1
Consider the default theory T 1 = ∅, D 1 , where
The corresponding de.l.p. will be P T1 = (∅, ∆ 1 ), where ∆ 1 has the following defeasible rules.
Each default rule is translated into a defeasible rule, using an extra literal (p i ) acting as a guard. A derivation for ¬ p i implies that the justification (from the original default rule) cannot be assumed consistently. In this way, the transformation captures, through these three defeasible rules, the behavior of the original default rule.
Example 2
Consider a de.l.p. P T2 = (∅, ∆ 2 ), obtained from a default theory T 2 = ∅, D 2 , where ∆ 2 has the rules:
This example shows the use given to the new literals p i introduced in the translation. Literal p 2 determines an attack point in the argument for the literal c and this argument is defeated (see remark 3.5 and figure 1 ). For this reason, literal c is not warranted in DELP ∅ , it is an UNDECIDED literal. This attack reflects the incompatibility between the original default rules y : ¬ b/c and x : a/b. In the original default theory, literal c is a credulous consequence, since no successful process includes both default rules. There is only a successful process including x : a/b.
It is possible to identify in the de.l.p. P obtained by the translation, two kind of attacks. Note that, every attack in P reflects the existence of two applicable default rules that are incompatible. This incompatibility arises for one of the following reasons:
• the consequences of both default rules are contradictory, or
• the consequence of one of them is contradictory with the justification of the other Figure 2 depicts an attack that arise from contradiction between the consequences of two default rules, and figure 3 , an attack over a justification. In this case the (artificial) attack point is the new literal introduced by the translation.
... It is interesting to note, that normal default rules could be translated in a more concise manner. The translation of a general default rule α : β/γ has to model the two main characteristics captured by a default rule:
-the antecedent α is needed to derive the consequent γ (i). -there is no knowledge against the justification β (ii).
This translation is required to model, in DELP ∅ , the interaction between conflicting information in the same way it is done in Default Logic. Direct conflicts between default rules arise when their consequents are contradictory or the consequent of one default is contradictory with the justification of the other. For normal default theories justifications and consequents are the same, therefore, a direct conflict between default rules arises when it is possible to derive information against the consequent of a default rule. For this reason it is possible to give a reduced translation for normal default rules.
Reduced transformation If the variant considered is DELP
∅ , the translation of a normal default rule α : γ/γ can be reduced to a single defeasible rule:
That is, in the reduced transformation any argument for ¬ γ attacks the argument for γ (see figure 4) . This attack establishes a defeat, because in DELP ∅ , attack determines defeat. In the initial transformation, any argument for ¬ γ allows the formation of an argument for the literal ¬ p i that attacks (block), in the same way, the argument for γ. In this way, both transformations reflect, in the obtained DELP ∅ program, the same pretended behaviour of the original default logic.
Hence, in what follows, normal default rules will be translated using the reduced form. In this way, a DELP ∅ program obtained by translating the normal default rules into the general form or into the reduced form, models in the same way the original default theory. The dialectical analysis that could be carried out in any of these translations is equivalent, and this is because of the comparison criterion. The only kind of defeaters present in DELP ∅ are blocking defeaters. For this reason, if an argument has two defeaters both are blocking defeaters. The elimination or addition of defeaters does not change the scenario: the main argument remains defeated (see figure  5 ). These characteristics are proper of DELP ∅ , since using a different comparison criterion proper defeats can arise and, in these situations, the elimination of one defeater could provoke others defeaters to change their status (see figure 6 ). -Literal l is a skeptical consequence of T iff l is warranted from P .
-Literal l is a credulous consequence of T iff l is undecided in P
In order to understand this relation, we can analyze the relation between the processes determining the extensions of the default theory, and the arguments that can be constructed using the defeasible rules obtained by the translation. Note that we are considering just the original literals in the theory, not the p i literals added by the translation.
Given a default rule δ i = α : β/γ we define t(δ i ) as the set of defeasible rules obtained by the translation of a default rule δ i . Thus, in the general case
In the same way, we define the set of defeasible rules obtained by the entire set of default rules
Finally, given a de.l.p. P = (Π, ∆) and a set R ⊆ ∆ we denote args P (R) = {A : A, h is an argument structure in P and A ⊆ R}. Now, let Γ be a closed and successful process of a default theory T = ∅, D , E = In(Γ) be the corresponding extension, Γ s be the set of defaults rules in Γ (i.e. Γ s = {δ | δ occurs in Γ}), and P = T DL delp (T ) be the de.l.p. obtained by the translation proposed. Note that arguments in args P (t(Γ s )) are conflict free; that is, for all argument A in args P (t(Γ s )) there is no other argument B attacking A. Otherwise, conflicting default rules would belong to Γ, and this is not possible since Γ is a successful process. Moreover, args P (t(Γ s )) is a maximal set of non-conflicting arguments since every argument B that does not attack an argument in args P (t(Γ s )) comes from default rules that are not in conflict with the rules in Γ. If such argument B exists, Γ would not be closed.
In this way, if a literal w is warranted from P there exists a non attacked argument A w , w that is in every maximal conflict-free set of arguments. Then, literal w will be in every extension of T and it is a skeptical consequence of T . On the other hand, given a literal u if every supporting argument A u , u is attacked by other argument B u ′ , u ′ both arguments have to be in different conflict-free sets of arguments. Therefore, two or more extensions exists and literal u cannot be present in all of them. For this reason, u will be a credulous consequence of T . Note that, u is undecided in T DL delp (T ).
Dung's framework for DL
The relation established between Default Logic and DELP is, in some aspects, similar to the one established in Dung's work [9] which considers a default theory as an argumentation framework. There, an argumentation framework AF (T ) = AR T , attacks T is defined for a default theory T = W, D , where:
A set K is said to be a support for k with respect to T if there exists a default derivation k 1 , k 2 . . . , k m with k m = k such that for each k i , either k i ∈ W , or k i is consequence of the preceding elements in the sequence or k i = γ for a default rule α : β1,...,βn γ such that α is a previous element in the sequence and every β i is in K.
Defining this framework, Reiter's extensions of a default theory T = W, D can be associated to the stable extensions of AR T .
Remember that in Dung's framework a set of arguments S is a stable extension iff S = {A | A is not attacked by any argument in S}. On the one hand, given a set of arguments A in AR T the set of consequences it supports are defined: f lat(A) = {k | ∃(K, k) ∈ A}. On the other hand, given a set of consequences E, the set of arguments that are consistent with it, is also defined: ARGS(E) = {(K, k) ∈ AR T | ∀j ∈ K, {j} ∪ E ⊢ ⊥}. Therefore, E is a Reiter's extension of T = W, D iff E = f lat(ARGS(E)).
Considering the transformation proposed, we can see that arguments from T DL delp (T ) can be used to identify the arguments of this argumentative framework. Suppose that A, t is an argument in the de.l.p.T DL delp (T ), we can define the following set of literals:
This set K A constitutes a support for literal t with respect to T . That is, (K A , t) ∈ AR T in Dung's framework. Observe that every argument A, t in T DL delp (T ) is constructed using the defeasible rules obtained by the translation. However, the existence of a supporting argument for t is because of the presence of a set of default rules (in the original default theory) that allows a default derivation S for t. The default rules that could be used in T = W, D for constructing S are identified by the literals p i mentioned in A. If a defeasible rule p i -≺ is present in A, the default rule δ i is
